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Comment
Plain English or Plain Confusing?
I. INTRODUCTION
A "presumption of perfection" attaches to the pattern instructions that
Missouri judges read to jurors in every civil case.' Missouri law presumes that
these instructions, as set forth in Missouri Approved Jury Instructions ("MAI")
Fifth Edition, are not only infallible statements of the law, but also perfectly
comprehensible to the average juror.2 Even if jurors in a given case complain
that they do not understand a particular pattern instruction, the trial judge is
without recourse, required to leave these instructions undisturbed even if a more
understandable improvement might result
Before MAI, Missouri appellate courts had long held that legal accuracy,
not general comprehensibility to the lay juror, was the primary goal of jury
instructions One amused commentator even identified a Missouri "152-word-
1. See, e.g., Teaney v. City of St. Joseph, 548 S.W.2d 254, 256-57 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (finding reversible error where the trial judge attempted to clarify the meaning of
pattern jury instructions in response to written request from the jury foreperson) (citing
Houston v. Northup, 460 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. 1970)). See Walter W. Steele & Elizabeth
G. Thomburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV.
77, 82 (1988) (summarizing the Teaney court's decision as reliant upon a "legal fiction:
these instructions are perfect, so the jury must understand them").
2. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 1, at 82.
3. How to Use This Book: Committee Comment (1996 Revision), MIssouRi
SUPREME COURT COMMITrEE ON JURY INsTRUCTIONS, MIssouRI APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS LIII, LV (5th ed. 1996) ('You may have the ability to improve an
instruction in MAI but you do not have the authority to do it. Do not do it. The use of
a provided MAI is mandatory. If you think the change of a word or phrase will make it
a better instruction, do not do it. You are falling into error if you do."). At least one
commentator has criticized MAI's approach as "rigid" and "inflexible." See Graham
Douthwaite, Jury Instructions, Pattern and Otherwise, 29 DEF. L.J. 335, 349 (1980)
("[C]ounsel are not permitted to 'improve' or modify MAI, and the number of jury
verdicts that have been reversed for failure to follow the exact wording of an MAI
instruction, or religiously to pay obeisance to the 'Notes On Use,' may well cause one
seriously to doubt whether this mandatory approach does not engender more litigation
that it is worth.").4. Robert P. Charrow, Book Review, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1094, 1097-98 (1983).
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sentence" rule for jury instructions which sanctioned excess verbiage without
requiring basic coherence.' MAI's drafting committee purports to depart from
this approach. The committee, comprised entirely of attorneys, like the drafting
committees of most states,6 claims to place equal emphasis upon legal accuracy
and understandability.'
In contrast to the emphasis in many states upon legal accuracy,' as well as
the apparent equal emphasis of the MAI drafters upon both accuracy and
5. Id Charrow cites Tuttle v. Tomasino, 336 S.W.2d 683, 692 (Mo. 1960), where
the Missouri Supreme Court approved a trial court instruction containing a 152-word
sentence, ruling that "unless the instruction is in fact misleading, it will not be held
erroneous because of its inept composition." Id. See also Phil H. Cook, Instructionese:
Legalistic Lingo of Contrived Confusion, 7 J. of Mo. BAR. 113, 114 (1951) (criticizing
the emphasis of Missouri appellate courts upon legal "exactness" over "simplicity which
can be understood by every juror").
6. See Bruce D. Sales, Amiram Elwork & James J. Alfini, Improving
Comprehension for Jury Instructions, in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY
VOLUME 1: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23,28 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1977) ("[Mjost
jury instruction drafting committees continue to be composed solely of judges and
lawyers.").
7. 1963 Report to Missouri Supreme Court, Missouri Supreme Court Committee
on Jury Instructions, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (5th ed. 1996) (noting
that the "four tests" of a permissible pattern jury instructions include (1) whether the
instruction is a "correct statement of law" and (4) whether it is "stated in language the
average juror can understand").
8. See Douthwaite, supra note 3, at 349. See also Amiram Elwork, Bruce D. Sales
& James J. Alfini, Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light oflt?, in 1
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 163, 164 (1977) ("Although [pattern instructions] have been
prepared to be legally accurate, little attention has been given to making them
understandable to the average juror. Most drafting committees are composed solely of
judges and lawyers, and few committees have been willing to hire language experts.");
Hon. Gail Hagerty, Instructing the Jury? Watch Your Language!, 70 N.D. L. REV. 1007,
1008-09 (1994). Commentators have extensively noted and criticized appellate courts
and drafting committees for their general sacrifice of understandability in the quest for
legal precision. See, e.g., Robert G. Nieland, Assessing the Impact of Pattern Jury
Instructions, 62 JUDICATURE 185, 188 (1978) (The author cites the JUDGES OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ("BAJI") (1938), in their notorious statement that "[t]he one thing an
instruction must do above all else is correctly state the law. This is true regardless of
who is capable of understanding it.'); Hon. Edward J. Devitt, Ten Practical Suggestions
About Federal Jury Instructions, 38 F.R.D. 75, 76 (1965) ("It is the legal principle, not
the words expressing it, which is pertinent and which will be helpful to the jury."). But
see George P. Smith, II, Effective Instructions to the Federal Jury in Civil Cases-A
Consideration in Microcosm, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV 559, 564-65 (1967) (noting the
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comprehensibility, a wealth of empirical research and scholarly commentaries
over the past twenty years have indicated that simplicity and comprehensibility
need far more attention.' Numerous studies have identified an ongoing
nationwide problem ofjuror miscomprehension of pattern instructions. 0 Other
research efforts have taken the next step: searching for ways to make currently
incomprehensible instructions understandable to jurors. Most of these studies
9. See Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 283 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds., 1985)
("[S]everal recent research projects have repeatedly demonstrated that pattern instructions
are often incomprehensible to the average juror and that this is a nationwide problem.");
William H. Erickson, Criminal Jury Instructions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 285, 290
(advocating a balance between the competing goals of legal accuracy and
understandability); Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-sense: Jury Trial Communication,
1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 617-18 (noting the twin aims of legal accuracy and
comprehensibility can be impossible to reconcile); Harvey S. Perlman, Pattern Jury
Instructions: The Application of Social Science Research, 65 NEB. L. REV. 520, 528
(1986) ("[A] series of empirical studies have documented first, that pattern jury
instructions are not completely understood by the jurors to whom they are
addressed.... ."); Laurence J. Severance, Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Toward
Criminal Jury Instructions that Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
198, 202 (1984) ("Recent social science research suggests that jurors' difficulties in
understanding instructions on the law are considerable and widespread."); Peter M.
Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 42
(1993) ("Much research by linguists, psychologists and others has confirmed that jurors
tend to have great difficulty understanding the instructions that are supposed to guide
their decision making.").
10. See, e.g., Raymond W. Buchanan, Bert Pryor, K. Phillip Taylor & David U.
Strawn, Legal Communication: An Investigation of Juror Comprehension of Pattern
Instructions, 26 COMM. Q. 31, 31, 34 (1978) (finding juror miscomprehension, at an
average rate of thirty percent, of legal issues in Florida pattern instructions); Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 205, 218 (juror performance on comprehension tests covering California pattern
instructions found little better than random guessing); Robert F. Forston, Justice, Jurors
andJudge's Instructions, 12 JUDGES' J. 68, 68 (1973) (finding juror comprehension of
the legal issues involved in instructions in Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois to be less than
fifty percent); Hagerty, supra note 8, at 1012-16 (using North Dakota pattern instruction
regarding the meaning of the phrase "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" and
finding low juror comprehension and high reliance upon the news media to define this
phrase); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L. & SOC'Y REV. 153, 171-73
(1982) (finding widespread juror miscomprehension of the basic legal issues involved
in a criminal trial, as presented by Washington pattern criminal instructions); David U.
Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE
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have found significant improvement in juror comprehension levels when
traditional pattern instructions are rewritten based upon psycholinguistic
principles of "simple English."'"
With these findings in mind, this Comment applies these same principles
to each of the 105 "verdict directors"'2 contained in MAI (Civil) Fifth Edition.3
There are two purposes for such an undertaking. First, this Comment seeks to
ascertain the general prevalence, or absence, among the MAI verdict directors
of the sorts of problems that empirical researchers have identified as barriers to
juror comprehension. Second, this Comment seeks to make suggestions for
possible improvement.
This effort differs from other critical and empirical works that have focused
upon comprehension problems with pattern jury instructions. First, while the
pattern jury instructions of many states have garnered the special attention of
commentators and researchers, 4 no works exist containing a detailed treatment
of MAI. 5 In addition, most of these studies have focused upon the
comprehensibility of only one or a few of the pattern instructions of a particular
11. These studies employ the comprehension-improvement methods of
"psycholinguistics," which "appl[y] the techniques of experimental psychology to
achieve improvements in language processing and comprehension." William W.
Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731,
740 (1981). See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1306, 1328 (1979) (finding significantly better ability among subjects to paraphrase
California pattem jury instructions rewritten based upon psycholinguistic principles);
Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 175-78 (finding higher memory and
comprehension levels with respect to rewritten Michigan pattern instructions); Amiram
Elwork, James J. Alfini & Bruce D. Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65
JUDICATURE 432, 436 (1982) (showing better juror comprehension of rewritten
instructions than Florida pattern instructions and Nevada non-pattern instructions); Steele
& Thornburg, supra note 1, at 90-91 (finding better comprehension of Texas pattern
instructions following psycholinguistic revision).
12. MAI uses the term "verdict director" in reference to instructions that describe
the affirmative elements a civil plaintiff must prove as a part of his or her cause of action.
13. MAI Fifth Edition chapters 17-31 provide the verdict directors. These chapters
set forth more than 105 individual instructions, but this Comment analyzes only those
instructions that embody affirmative claims for relief, excluding the special instructions
in these chapters dealing with damages issues and the definition of terms. See, e.g., MAI
21.05 (defining categories of damages in actions against health care providers).
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. Commentary on Missouri's civil jury instruction scheme has not gone beyond
isolated general criticisms of the state's traditional emphasis upon legal accuracy in
instructions and strict approach with respect to modifications of mandatory instructions
by trial attorneys and judges. See, e.g., Douthwaite, supra note 3, at 349.
[Vol. 62
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state.' 6 None have looked at the language contained in a state's entire set of
verdict directors.
Finally, a critical evaluation of the general comprehensibility of the
language of MAI pattern instructions remains significant even though Missouri
jurors have access to those instructions, in written form, during deliberations.17
Though this allowance provides them with the opportunity to reread instructions,
jurors most often receive their best understanding of the instructions from the
initial oral charge of the judge." In any event, multiple "rereadings" do not
ensure ajuror's comprehension of an instruction."9 In addition, jurors often pay
16. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1311-13 (psycholinguistic
analysis limited to 14 California pattern jury instructions); Steele & Thornburg, supra
note 1, at 88-90 (rewriting five Texas pattern criminal instructions based upon
psycholinguistic principles); Hagerty, supra note 8, at 1012 (focusing on one definitional
instruction).
17. MO. Sup. CT. R. 70.02(f) provides: "The final instructions on the law
governing the case shall be read to the jury by the court and provided to the jury in
writing." See VEDA R. CHARROW & MYRA K. ERHARDT, CLEAR & EFFECTIVE LEGAL
WRITING 32 (1986) (discussing the importance of drafting jury instructions in a style
appropriate for oral comprehension); DAVID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE &
NONSENSE 88-89 (1982) (same).
18. See Wylie A. Aitken, Comment, The Jury Instruction Process-Apathy or
Aggressive Reform?, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 137, 139 (1965) ("[Ihe primary factor toward
meaningfulness [ofjury instructions forjurors is the] oral presentation.... ."); Christopher
N. May, "What Do We Do Now? ": Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 869, 881 (1995) (arguing jurors during deliberations garner little additional
understanding of the applicable law from other jurors); ROBERT L. MCBRIDE, THE ART
OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY § 5.09, at 200 (1969) (discussing the importance jurors place
upon words coming directly from the trial judge); James W. McElhaney, Jury
Instructions: When Jurors'Eyes Glaze Over, They're Telling You Something, 81 A.B.A.
J. 91 (1995) (discussing the oral charge as the time when jurors most concentrate on
understanding the jury instructions); 1959 Institute for California Judges-Panel
Discussion Part NI: Instructing the Jury, 47 CAL. L. REV. 888, 900 (1959) (Comments
of Hon. William T. Sweigert) (noting the importance of the trial judge's initial oral
charge to overall juror comprehension of the applicable law); Sales, Elwork & Alfini,
supra note 6, at 68 ("Several experimenters have shown that vocalization of written
material facilitates memory. Having the judge read the jury instructions assures that each
juror pays attention to them at least once.").
19. See, e.g., Joseph J. O'Mara & Rolf von Eckartsberg, Proposed Standard Jury
Instructions-Evaluation of Usage and Understanding, 48 PA. B. ASS'N. Q. 542, 549-50
(1977) (empirical study finding low comprehension levels of Pennsylvania pattern
instructions despite opportunity for rereading). See also Bernard S. Meyer & Maurice
Rosenberg, Questions Juries Ask: Untapped Springs oflnsight, 55 JUDICATURE 105, 107
(1971) ("Of course, repeating ad infinitum an instruction that deals with an elusive
concept will not remove the jurors' puzzlement if it is rooted in their inability to grasp
the subtle meaning of the legal term . . . ."); Elwork & Sales, supra note 9, at 290
19971
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little attention to the written instructions." Other commentators have pointed out
that even when jurors rely on written instructions, there may be a significant gap
between their perceived and actual comprehension.2 It is obvious that, even
with Missouri's provision for written instructions, a generally unintelligible
pattern jury instruction can have a detrimental effect on juror comprehension
from the initial oral charge until the conclusion of deliberations.
Part II of this Comment discusses the many problem areas that
psycholinguistic researchers have identified as impediments to full juror
comprehension of pattern jury instructions. Here, the author analyzes the
criticism of pattern jury instructions that have come from both empirical
researchers and general commentators. Part III explains the method by which
the author detected the presence of such problem areas in the MAI verdict
directors. This Comment discusses the results of this detection process in Part
IV. Finally, Part V details the conclusions of the author, specifically the ways
by which the Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions might
improve the MAI verdict directors.
II. BARRIERS To MAXIMUM JUROR COMPREHENSION
OF PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS
A. The Psycholinguistic Approach
The work of psycholinguists involves inquiry into the ways by which the
human mind processes and understands oral and written language, thus
"provid[ing] a number of useful tools for assessing the comprehensibility of legal
(conceding the lack of empirical evidence that the increased exposure to instructions
provided by written charges leads to any increase in juror comprehension).
20. See, e.g., Steele & Thomburg, supra note 1, at 9 (empirical finding that jurors
reread the instructions aloud as a group during only two-thirds ofjury deliberations). See
also Hon. Norris Maloney, Should Jurors Have Written Instructions?, TRIAL JUDGES' J.,
April 1967, at 18 (arguing jurors are less likely to reread instructions during deliberations
in a factually and legally less-complex case); Ronald M. Price, Study of the North
Carolina Jury Charge: Present Practice and Future Proposals, 6 WAKE FOREST
INTRAMURAL L. REv. 459, 461 (1970) (discussing how jurors often do not take
advantage of the opportunity to read written instructions in a jurisdiction in which the
provision of written instructions is permissive, rather than mandatory). Additionally, the
jury foreperson may do all the reading of jury instructions for other jurors, possibly
interjecting his or her own paraphrases of the written charge. See, e.g., Ben T. Head,
Confessions of a Juror, 44 F.R.D. 330, 337 (1968) (complaining that such was a part of
the author's personal experience as ajuror).
21. See, e.g., Severance & Loftus, supra note 10, at 163 ("Jurors may sometimes
think they have understood instructions when they have not."); Scott Slonim, Juries Say
Jury Instructions Hampered by Legalese, 66 A.B.A. J. 132, 133 (1980).
[Vol. 62
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language."'  Specifically, psycholinguistic study helps identify characteristics
of the language in jury instructions that both foster and hinder juror
comprehension.' The work of psycholinguists already has influenced the
drafting of pattern jury instructions in several jurisdictions,24 though it has not
done so in Missouri.'
Psycholinguistic researchers, as well as legal commentators in general, have
consistently traced the causes of juror miscomprehension of pattern jury
instructions to at least two sources:26 problems with (1) vocabulary (i.e., the
particular words used) and (2) grammar/sentence structure (i.e., the ways
particular words are arranged into phrases, clauses and entire sentences).,7
22. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1308 n.7. See also Schwarzer, supra
note 11, at 740; Brenda Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 L. & Soc'Y REv. 445,
453 (1980) (defining psycholinguistics as "the study of the mental processes involved in
the acquisition and use of language").
23. Edward J. Imwinkelreid & Lloyd R. Schwed, Guidelines for Drafting
Understandable Jury Instructions: An Introduction to the Use of Psycholinguistics, 23
CRiM. L. BULL. 135, 138 (1987) ("[P]sycholinguistic research tends to show that [there]
are techniques for making jury instructions appreciably more readable and
understandable."). Psycholinguists define "comprehensibility," or comprehension, as
"the extent to which a person understands another person's intended meaning." Sales,
Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 31.
24. See Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 106 (discussing the involvement of
psycholinguists with pattern jury instruction drafting committees in Oregon and
Montana); J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions
Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 155, 165
(1991) (describing the efforts of drafting committees in Alaska, Florida and Pennsylvania
to seek the input of psycholinguistic researchers with respect to the drafting of
instructions).
25. Tanford, supra note 24, at 164-66 (noting states in which social scientific and
psycholinguistic research has impacted the jury instruction policymaking of legislatures,
appellate courts and drafting committees).
26. Many researchers and commentators also commonly identify a third major
problem area: The organization of (1) sentences into entire instructions and (2)
individual instructions into complete jury charges. See, e.g., Imwinkelreid & Schwed,
supra note 23, at 146-50 (discussing the three psycholinguistic organizational techniques
designed to produce the more comprehensible overall organization ofjury instructions).
Detailed treatment of this problem area is beyond the scope of this Comment due to its
focus upon individual MAI verdict directors in isolation. See generally K. Phillip Taylor,
Raymond W. Buchanan, Bert Pryor & David U. Strawn, Avoiding the Legal Tower of
Babel: A Case Study of Innovative Jury Instruction, JUDGES' J., Summer 1980, at 10, 12
(detailing the need for clear, logical organization in a set ofjury instructions).
27. See, e.g., Elwork & Sales, supra note 9, at 292-93 (speaking to the need for
jury instructions to use simple sentences and common words); McBride, supra note 18,
at 179, 190, 195 (detailing the importance of "ordinary, understandable language" and
1997]
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Researchers have crafted entire studies around the intricacies of these two
categories.28 Applying their insights to the language in MI verdict directors
yields useful methods for evaluating and improving the comprehensibility of
those instructions.
B. Vocabulary
Though one of the primary purposes of standardizing jury instructions is to
increase juror comprehension through simplified vocabulary,29 the most common
simple sentences); Perlman, supra note 9, at 529 (noting "vocabulary, grammar, and
organization"); Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries, supra note 11, at 740 (focusing
on "language, sentence structure and context"); Severance, Greene & Loftus, supra note
9, at 200 ("Misunderstanding can arise from the syntax of the instructions, the manner
of presentation, or the general unfamiliarity of lay people with legal terminology.");
Severance & Loftus, supra note 10, at 157 (discussing how psycholinguists seek to revise
the "vocabulary, grammar, and organization" of pattern instructions); Steele &
Thornburg, supra note 1, at 83 (emphasizing "vocabulary, syntax, and organization");
Slonim, supra note 21, at 132 (noting the comprehension problems presented by
"grammatical and semantic constructions"); David U. Strawn, Raymond W. Buchanan,
Bert Pryor & K. Phillip Taylor, Reaching a Verdict, Step by Step, 60 JUDICATURE 383,
387 (1977) (discussing the importance of the "simplest possible language" and simple
sentences injury instructions); Jamison Wilcox, The Craft of Drafting Plain-Language
Jury Instructions: A Study of a Sample Pattern Instruction on Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L.Q.
1159, 1178 n.69 (1986) (dividing the "plain language style" into the areas ofvocabulay,
grammar and organization).
28. See, e.g., Danet, supra note 22, at 484-86 (addressing the possible barrier to
comprehension created by (1) uncommon and abstract words, and (2) sentence length,
complexity and verb choice); Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 165-69 (criticizing
use in jury instructions of (1) uncommon words, homonyms and "negators"; and (2)
complex sentences and passive constructions); Inwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23,
at 138-46 (dividing analysis into (1) "choice of words," advocating the avoidance of
legalese, "nominalizations," and abstract words; and (2) "use of phrases and clauses" and
"sentence structure," advocating a similar avoidance of passive voice, dependent clauses
and oddly placed prepositional phrases); Allan Lind & Anthony Partridge, Suggestions
for Improving Juror Understanding of Instructions, in PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER COMMITTEE TO STUDY
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Appendix A) 69, 70-77 (1982) (suggesting that pattern
jury instructions avoid (1) homonyms, legal terms, uncommon and negative words; and
(2) sentences omitting relative pronouns and using multiple subordinate clauses); Sales,
Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 31-58 (breaking down criticism ofjury instructions into
(1) seven categories relating to vocabulary and (2) four categories relating to
"grammatical constructions").
29. See Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 24 (describing the primary purpose
of states' adoption of pattern jury instructions as "[providing] the judge with a concise,
error-free statement of the law which is intelligible to the average juror"); Smith, supra
[Vol. 62
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criticism of pattern instructions remains the complexity of their diction.3" Even
without empirical evidence, commentators have credibly pointed out that pattern
jury instructions are too full of "legalese."31 One need take no more than a quick
glance through the MAI verdict directors, with their references to such legal
concepts as substantial performance and good faith, in order to formulate just
such a general criticism.32
note 8, at 573 (defining pattern jury instructions as "formulated or specimen copies of
instructions which may be applied repeatedly in typical cases"). In general, one can
identify at least four purposes common to the widespread adoption of pattern jury
instruction schemes: (1) saving time at trial, (2) reducing the amount of argument that
counsel can interject into instructions, (3) reducing the number of appeals based upon the
trial instructions and (4) increasing juror comprehension. Schwarzer, supra note 11, at
737-39.
30. See, e.g., Robert L. Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 456,
461 (1962) (addressing the need for "simplified terminology" and "more commonly
used" words in pattern jury instructions). A sampling of the wealth of literature in this
area finds the same repeated criticism. See Devitt, supra note 8, at 76-77 (absence of
"the common speech of man"); Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 224 ("convoluted, technical,
language"); Forston, supra note 10, at 68 ("lengthy technical instructions"); Head, supra
note 20, at 336 (need for "language of the man on the street"); Lind & Partridge, supra
note 28, at 70 ("use of uncommon words"); 1959 Institute for California Judges, supra
note 18, at 900 (need for "common, ordinary language"); Price, supra note 20, at 466
(lack of "simple everyday terms"); Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 10, at 482
("uncommon words").
31. See, e.g., Prentice H. Marshall, Introduction, in PArERN CRIINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 28, at vii ("It is all too easy for the lawyers and judges who
engage in the drafting process to forget how much of their vocabulary and language style
was acquired in law school."); Charles L. Weltner, Juror Perceptions: Why the Jury
Doesn't Understand the Judge's Instructions, 18 JUDGES' J. 18, 21 (1989) (citing
"reasonableness of fears," "cooling of passions," and "constructive and actual notice" as
examples). See also Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 165 ('Two of the most
important lexical variables that need to be controlled in the writing ofjury instructions
are the use of legal jargon and the use of uncommon words."); Perlman, supra note 9, at
529-30 (advocating the replacement, in appropriate instances, of legal jargon with more
commonly used words); Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 740 (criticizing use of "legal
jargon"); Smith, supra note 8, at 571 ('The most effective instructions are those which
are delivered in a clear, audible and, when possible, conversational tone; simple, non-
technical language should be used over legalese."); Steele & Thomburg, supra note 1,
at 86 (advocating the elimination of legal jargon and unfamiliar words).
32. See, e.g., MAI 24.02 [1981 Revision], "F.E.L.A.-Boiler Act Violation" ("his
employment in some way closely and substantially affected interstate commerce"); MAI
25.04 [1978 Revision], "Strict Liability-Product Defect" ("defective condition
unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use"); MAI 26.07 [1981
Revision], "Breach of Bilateral Contract-When Substantial Performance Sufficient"
("plaintiff substantially performed his agreement [in a workmanlike manner]"); MAI
9
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For others, this criticism, as applied to pattern jury instructions, comprises
just one part of an entire philosophy embracing simplified legal language, i.e. the
"plain English" movement?3 In the specific context of pattern jury instructions,
plain English commentators and researchers have recommended the avoidance
of "low-frequency" words, "nominalizations," and negative words.34
1. Low-frequency Words
A mass of psycholinguistic research supports the common-sense
proposition that jurors understand and remember familiar terms more easily than
uncommon words and phrases. 5 Commentators have referred to the most
familiar words in the English language as "high-frequency" words, meaning
words that appear repeatedly in plain English writings, such as newspapers.3
Jurors who hear and read such words are able to recognize their meaning more
quickly and remain undistracted when the oral or written instruction moves on
27.04, "Ejectment--Counterclaim for Value of Improvements" ("entered into possession
of the premises under a good faith claim of title"); MAI 31.02(3) [1997 Revision], "Res
Ipsa Loquitur-General" ("from the fact of such occurrence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom").
33. See, e.g., Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 727,
728 (1978) (applying psycholinguistic principles to all forms of legal writing based upon
the contention that "good legal writing is plain English"). See also August J. Goebel,
Defects in Jury Instructions: Can They be Eliminated?, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 290,298 (1979)
(discussing the need to draft jury instructions "in plain English instead of writing them
in the language of the law"); Hagerty, supra note 8, at 1007 (advocating "plain-language
instructions"); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Helping the Jury Understand, LITG., Summer
1980, at 5, 6 (speaking to the need for "'de-legalized,' plain language" in jury
instructions); Proximate What? Only the Ph.D. Knew, 64 A.B.A. J. 660 (1978)
(advocating "ordinary" and "straightforward English"); William F. Schwarzer, Jury
Instructions: We Can Do Better, LITIG., Winter 1982, at 5, 6 (arguing that
psycholinguistic principles can help jury instructions written in "plain English"). The
"plain English" movement traces its roots to the 1970's, when professionals and
participants in government agencies and many areas of the private business sector began
looking for ways to reform the language of business and government documents. For a
detailed discussion, see Danet, supra note 22, at 451-52; Wydick, supra, at 727-29.
34. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
35. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 165 ("There are literally hundreds of
psycholinguistic studies that have demonstrated that familiar words are more easily
perceived, remembered, and comprehended."); Danet, supra note 22, at 484
("Psycholinguists find that uncommon words are more poorly perceived, remembered,
and understood.").
36. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 165 (stating that familiar are "those
words in our language that are used most frequently in magazines and newspapers.").
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to subsequent words, phrases and sentences.17 Even when the meaning of a
"low-frequency" word is known to ajuror, he or she may process that meaning
somewhat slowly, neglecting fully to concentrate on the rest of the instruction.38
To determine objectively which words are high-frequency and which are
not, psycholinguists have turned to Edward L. Thorndike and Irving Lorge,
authors of The Teacher's Word Book of30, 000 Words,39 for guidance.40 This
work reports the number of times, per one million words, that a given word
appears in common written English.4' Researchers refer to words appearing less
than ten times per million words as low-frequency words-the kind of words
that endanger maximum juror comprehension.42 Determining the prevalence of
low-frequency words in MAI verdict directors is as simple as looking up
"suspect" words in Thorndike and Lorge.43
2. Nominalizations
Nominalizations are nouns created from verbs.44 The common way to
create a nominalization is to add an ending, such as "-ing," "-tion," or "-al," to
a verb stem.45 Common examples that might crop up in a pattern jury instruction
37. Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 33 ("[S]ince high frequency words are
perceived more quickly, it is reasonable to predict that jury instructions will be processed
more easily if common words are used .... The easier and more meaningful this
decoding process becomes, the easier it should be to comprehend the entire message.").
38. Lind & Partridge, supra note 28, at 70 ("Even if the meaning is known, it will
generally require more effort to understand a passage containing one or more uncommon
words than a passage whose vocabulary is more familiar.").
39. This work, first published in 1944, continues in print and. analyzes the
frequency with which words appear in written samples from numerous magazines and
120 juvenile books. See Edward L. Thomdike & Irving Lorge, Introduction, in THE
TEAcHER's WORD BOOK OF 30,000 WORDs (1944).
40. Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 32 ("Since Thomdike and Lorge
(1944) published their frequency counts of 30,000 English words, it [has become] easier
for researchers to ... test [the] hypothesis [that familiar words are more easily understood
and remembered]. Indeed, the hypothesis is now generally supported by literally
hundreds of psycholinguistic studies."). See also Lind & Partridge, supra note 28, at 70-
71 (citing Thorndike & Lorge as the most useful publication for determining word
frequency).
41. See Thormdike & Lorge, Introduction, supra note 39.
42. Lind & Partridge, supra note 28, at 71 "We suggest that... words be regarded
as particularly suspect if they are reported in Thoradike and Lorge as appearing less
frequently than ten times per million words of writing.").
43. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
44. Tiersma, supra note 9, at 48.
45. Imwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23, at 139.
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include "failure," "admission," or "collision. ' 46 Commentators have criticized
legal writing in general for its overuse of nominalizations, which lend added
abstraction to a written work.4' As one writer stated in noting the abundance of
these words: "[T]he law is not abstract; it is part of a real world full of people
who live and move and do things to other people. Car drivers collide. Plaintiffs
complain. Judges decide."4
Researchers of pattern jury instructions have concluded that
nominalizations in instructions are barriers to juror comprehension. 49
Nominalizations dispense with simpler verb forms and in the process can
complicate the mind's comprehension of an entire sentence. 0 They can turn
complex sentences into simple ones, but any anticipated benefits in overall
comprehensibility are illusory: The replacement of an entire dependent clause5'
with a nominalization eliminates the "doer" of an action from the sentence.52
This adds ambiguity and needlessly distracts the reader or hearer who is trying
to grasp the meaning of the sentence as a whole. 3 MAI verdict directors are
susceptible to "nominalization testing," with "noun-from-verb" constructions
being fairly easy to spot during a focused reading5
4
3. Negative Words
Commentators uniformly criticize pattern jury instructions for their
abundant use of negatives words." For purposes of these criticisms, negative
46. See Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1321-22.
47. See generally Rudolf Flesch, Measuring the Level of Abstraction, 34 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 384, 385-86 (1950) (discussing the difference between "abstract" and
"concrete" words); James D. McCawley, Where Do Noun Phrases Come From?, in
READINGS IN ENGLISH TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 166 (1970) (describing the
differences in level of abstraction between nouns and verbs).
48. Wydick, supra note 33, at 745.
49. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1311, 1321, 1328 (finding
subjects were better able to paraphrase California pattern civil instructions after the
replacement of nominalizations).
50. Imwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23, at 139.
51. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
52. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1321 (citing, as an example, the
replacement of the dependent clause "when you are incorporating the material" with the
nominalization "the incorporation ofthe material").
53. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1321 ("The meaning of the sentence
becomes less clear, and the mind must work harder to decode it.").
54. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Higginbotham, supra note 33, at 6; Lind & Partridge, supra note 28,
at 75; Schwarzer, supra note 33, at 6; Slonim, supra note 21, at 132-33; Wilcox, supra
note 27, at 1167-68.
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words include not only "no," "not," and "never," but also any word connoting
a negative meaning or serving a negative function in a sentence. 6 Thus,
negative words also include conjunctions, such as "unless" or "except," or
adjectives and verbs having a negating prefix, such as "mis-," "dis-," or "un-. ' '57
Empirical research involving pattern jury instructions has shown juror
comprehension problems with negative sentences, problems which intensify as
the number of negative words in a sentence increases. 8
Specifically, commentators and psycholinguistic researchers explain that
negative words make the understanding of sentences more difficult by adding an
extra step to the comprehension process: the hearer or reader must first process
the sentence's meaning in positive terms before then being able to digest the
negative meaning. 9 Researchers recommend that drafters of pattern jury
instructions (1) replace negative words with positive terms and (2) limit the use
of negatives to expressing exceptions to foregoing propositions.' As with
nominalizations, negative words are easily detected in MAI verdict directors.'
4. Other Word Choice Concerns
A critical perusal of MAI verdict directors can also detect the presence, or
lack thereof, of other language problems that researchers have found in pattern
jury instructions. First, the presence of "unique determiners," common to legal
writing in general, can be a barrier to comprehensibility. 2 Unique determiners
include words, like "such" and "said," which are used to modify nouns even
56. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1324 n.48.
57. See Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 167 (citing "disregard" as a
common example in pattern jury instructions).
58. See Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1324-25 (finding subjects less able
to paraphrase pattern jury instructions correctly as the number of negative words
increased). See also Tiersma, supra note 9, at 50 (addressing the cumulative effect of
multiple negative words in a single sentence). See generally Elwork, Sales & Alfini,
supra note 8, at 167 (discussing psycholinguistic study of negative words in general).
59. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 167 ("[Using 'disregard' as an
example], this word requires the comprehension of the positive concept 'regard' and then
a negation of it.... Such negators require two steps: (1) the comprehension of the
positive version of a sentence, and (2) then denial of it."). See also Charrow, supra note
4, at 1100 ("Humans tend to think in positive terms; therefore, each negative which is
added to a sentence forces the reader (or listener) to add another mental step."); Sales,
Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 43-44.
60. See Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 167 ("The only time a negative
sentence should be used is when an exception needs to be emphasized."); Wilcox, supra
note 27, at 1167-68.
61. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Danet, supra note 22, at 481.
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when a simple "the" or "this" would suffice.63 Other researchers have criticized
the prevalence injury instructions of the prepositional phrase "as to."' Finally,
the "word list," or "doublet" (e.g., the phrase "give, bequeath, and devise"), is
another common feature of legal writing that has garnered critical attention due
to its use of unnecessary strings of verbs, adjectives or nouns.65
C. Grammar and Sentence Structure
Using simple words in pattern jury instructions does not ensure juror
comprehension, however, if drafters put those words together in an
incomprehensible fashion. Thus, most critics employing a psycholinguistic
approach have also scrutinized the grammar and sentence structure of pattern
jury instructions." The focus here is upon syntax, the way a writer or reader
puts words together.67
1. Complex Sentences
Although the "Missouri 152-word-sentence rule"68 takes the proposition to
its extreme, commentators generally agree that length alone is not an accurate
gauge of the overall comprehensibility of a written or spoken sentence.69 Rather,
63. Id (citing, as an example, the replacement of"in this event" with "in any such
event"). See generally CLARENCE STRATrON, HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH 285 (1940) ("The
use of saidto designate a person or thing already mentioned should be reserved for legal
and contract phraseology."). Stratton provides the following example: "The said firm,
hereinafter designated as the first party, does agree to pay to said Charles Brown ....
Id Due to the ambiguity of these words, some commentators discourage the use of
"unique determiners" even in the drafting of technical legal documents. See, e.g.,
CHARLES R. CALLEROs, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 444-45 (2d ed. 1994).
64. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1322-23 (finding the use of
this phrase as barrier to comprehension due to its relatively ambiguous meaning as
compared with other prepositions).
65. Id. at 1326, 1349. See generally RUDOLPH FLEsCH, HOW TO WRITE PLAIN
ENGLISH: A BOOK FOR LAWYERS AND CONSuMERs 40 (1979) (listing "cease and desist,"
"let or hindrance," and "null and void" as examples).
66. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
67. Danet, supra note 22, at 477 (identifying the many "syntactic features"
common to legal writing in general).
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1319 ("Linguistic research has
shown that sentences of the same length may vary greatly in actual comprehensibility.");
Imwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23, at 145. See generally A.J. Wearing, The Recall
of Sentences of Varying Length, 25 AUSTRL. J. PSYCHOL. 155 (1973) (discussing the
impact of sentence length upon understandability in general). But see Wydick, supra
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the appropriate inquiry centers on the complexity of a sentence. 7 Commentators
have criticized the use of a sentence containing a dependent clause,7' for
example, in preference to two simple sentences expressing the same
information. 2 Psycholinguists refer to dependent clauses as "embeddings,"73
and point out their adverse effect upon the ability of jurors to understand and
remember jury instructions. 74  As with negative words, the damage to
comprehension mounts as the number of dependent clauses within a sentence
increases.75
note 33, at 743 (recommending that legal writers keep their sentences shorter than 25
words).
70. See Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 167 ("It is reasonable to assume
that grammatical complexity should also have an effect on the comprehension and
memory of language.'); Lind & Partridge, supra note 28, at 74 ("Long sentences are as
easily understood as short sentences if they are simple in their grammatical structure.");
Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 47 ("In writing jury instructions... length
should only be a concern when it affects the grammatical complexity of a sentence.").
71. See, e.g., Slonim, supra note 21, at 132-33; Tiersma, supra note 9, at 51. A
complex sentence "is a sentence made up of one independent clause and one or more
dependent clauses," with (1) an independent clause being "a clause that could be used
alone as a simple sentence (e.g., 'three men left last night') and (2) a dependent clause,
i.e. subordinate clause, being a clause with "one subject and predicate which makes only
a half-sentence when standing alone (e.g., 'While we were sleeping, three men left last
night')." MICHAEL P. KAMMER& CHARLES W. MULLIGAN, WRITING HANDBOOK §§ B23,
C400, C402, at 61, 178 (1953). Dependent clauses may begin with either (1) indefinite
pronouns, such as "whose" and "which," or (2) subordinating conjunctions, such as
"after," "although," "because," "when," and "while." 1d. §§A158, C408, at 50, 180.
72. See Tiersma, supra note 9, at 51 ("A... problem with many jury instructions
is the large number of [complex sentences that] are often constructed by combining two
or more simple sentences.").
73. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1327; Elwork, Sales & Alfini,
supra note 8, at 168.
74. See, e.g., Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 45 ("[The] more
grammatically complex a sentence becomes, the greater the amount of information that
will be contained in it and the greater the amount of logical complexity that will result.").
See generally V.M. Holmes, Order of Main and Subordinate Clauses in Sentence
Perception, 12 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAv. 285, 287-90 (1973) (discussing
the impact of dependent clauses on memory and understanding).
75. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1327 ("[I]f a writer indiscriminately
embeds subordinate clauses, the likelihood that a difficult to comprehend embedding will
be used in a sentence should increase as the number of embeddings increases.").
Charrow & Charrow support their proposition with empirical data, finding a "high
negative correlation" between the frequency of use of dependent clauses in California
pattern jury instructions and the ability of subject jurors to paraphrase correctly the
meaning of such instructions. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1327. Simply, "as
the number of embeddings increased, comprehension decreased." Charrow & Charrow,
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More significant than the mere frequency of dependent clauses is the type
of dependent clause used by drafters in a particular sentence. 76 Researchers
categorize dependent clauses by their location in a sentence. Such a clause at the
beginning creates a "left-branching" sentence, 77 at the end, a "right-branching"
sentence,78 or when somewhere in the middle, a "center-branching" sentence. 9
The left-branching variety poses the greatest danger to juror comprehension"
because it forces the mind of the juror to process one thought (i.e., the dependent
clause) before letting the juror know what the sentence "is all about" (i.e., the
independent clause).8" In analyzing the MAI verdict directors, this Comment
evaluates the presence, quantity and type of dependent clauses in each
instruction. 2
supra note 11, at 1327.
76. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1327 (reporting "the types of
embeddings used in the instructions probably affected performance [i.e., ability ofjurors
to paraphrase meanings] more than the number of embeddings").
77. See Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 47 (defining "left-branching
embedded sentences" as sentences having a dependent clause "appear[ing] first
uninterrupted" and providing, as an example, "[wihile the driver was repairing the truck
he sang loudly") (emphasis added).
78. See Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 47 (defining "right-branching
self-embedded sentences" as sentences in which the independent clause "appears first
uninterrupted," and providing, as an example, "[t]he boys listened to the radio while they
were working") (emphasis added).
79. See Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 47 (describing "center-embedded
sentences" as those in which the independent clause is "interrupted by [a] subordinate
clause," with an example being "[t]he truck that Bill was driving crashed into the post")
(emphasis added). See also Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1328 n.59 (discussing
these same three types of uses of dependent clauses and providing examples).
80. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1327 (providing empirical support for
this proposition).
81. Lind & Partridge, supra note 28, at 74. See also Imwinkelreid & Schwed,
supra note 23, at 146 ("Mhe presence of a subordinate clause forces the jury to engage
in mental gymnastics to understand the entire sentence.").
82. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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2. Use of the Passive Voice
Like the use of dependent clauses,83 the presence of the passive voice" in
a pattern jury instruction can have a detrimental effect on the juror's ability to
understand and remember the meaning of the instruction.85 A verb in the passive
voice interjects extra words into a sentence 6 and creates comprehension
problems either by burying the "doer" of the action at the end of the sentence or
by omitting the "doer" entirely.' Similar to low-frequency words,88 verbs in the
passive voice can lend ambiguity and distraction to an instruction by diverting
the mind's attention from subsequent words and phrases, and shifting it towards
a search for the identity of the "actor."89
83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
84. "Passive voice' is the form of a verb "that shows that the subject is being acted
upon" while "active voice" means the form of a verb showing "that the subject is acting,"
e.g., "Herbert was teased by the lion" (passive voice) as compared with "Herbert teased
the lion" (active voice). Kammer & Mulligan, supra note 71, §§ C97-98, at 84. To
dispel a common myth among law students and legal writers in general, mere use of a
form of the infinitive "to be" does not necessarily, nor ordinarily, mean a writer is using
the passive voice. For example, the phrase "is using" in this footnote's preceding
sentence is not an example of passive voice. See, e.g., GEORGE D. GOPEN, WRITING
FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 21-22 (1981) (drawing a dubious analogy between use of
"to be" and "passive construction"). As well, one should "not confuse passive voice with
past tense." Kammer & Mulligan, supra note 71, § C99, at 84.
85. Danet, supra note 22, at 485-86; Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 8, at 168.
See also Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 6, at 52-53 ("[R]esearchers have suggested
that the active form is the natural form in which the mind stores propositions, and they
hypothesize that passive sentences should therefore take longer to decipher and store.").
See generally Higginbotham, supra note 33, at 6; Schwarzer, supra note 33, at 6.
However, many have pointed out that use of the passive voice can actually benefit juror
comprehension when the "receiver" of the action demands the emphasis of the sentence.
In such case, it is preferable for the "receiver" to appear first in the sentence. See
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1325 n.51; Wydick, supra note 33, at 746-47.
86. See supra note 84. See also Wydick, supra note 33, at 746.
87. See Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1325 n. 52 (distinguishing between
"full passive" sentences, which do not omit the "doer" of action, and "truncated passive"
sentences, which eliminate the "doer" from the sentence). See generally RENE J. CAPPON,
THE WORD: AN ASsOCIATED PRESS GUIDE TO GOOD NEWS WRITING 26-27 (1982) ("In
most cases, though, the passive is flabby, dropping the doer of a deed out of the picture.
That's why officialese is addicted to the passive mode. It is believed or it is estimated
allows the estimator and the believer to vanish in the fog.").
88. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
89. See WILLIAM ZINSSER, ON WRITING WELL: AN INFORMAL GUIDE TO WRITING
NONFICTION 101 (1980) ("A style which consists mainly of passive constructions ...
saps the reader's energy. He is never quite certain of what is being perpetrated by whom
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However, use of the passive voice in pattern jury instructions has drawn the
ire of psycholinguistic researchersP° only when it has appeared in dependent
clauses.9' The work of Robert and Veda Charrow, a law school professor and
psycholinguist, respectively, lends the most significant empirical support for this
proposition. 2 Studying California pattern instructions, they determined that the
mere presence of the passive voice did not significantly hurt juror
comprehension, but that the location of passive forms in dependent clauses did
lower understanding levels.93 Taking into account the conflicting findings of
researchers, this Comment notes both the presence and location of the passive
voice in the MAI verdict directors. 4
3. Other Grammatical Constructions
To a less significant extent scholars have identified other problem areas in
the sentence structure of pattern jury instructions. First, compound sentences,95
though not receiving the same attention as their complex counterparts, have
and on whom.") See also Imwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23, at 145 ("When the
juror hears 'It is said...' the juror may wonder who said it. Or if the juror hears 'It was
done...' the juror may wonder who did it."); Wydick, supra note 33, at 746 ("With
the active voice, the reader can usually see who is doing what to whom. But the passive
voice often leaves that unclear.").
90. See Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1325 ("[P]sycholinguistic research
regarding the comprehensibility of passive constructions has produced equivocal
results."); Danet, supra note 22, at 485 ("Though some studies find passives more
difficult to recall or comprehend, others fail to find a difference."); Sales, Elwork &
Alfini, supra note 6, at 52-53 (noting the conflicting findings of psycholinguistic
researchers with respect to the comprehensibility of the passive voice in general).
91. VEDA L. CHARROW, WHAT IS "PLAIN ENGLISH", ANYWAY? 9 (1979). See
Danet, supra note 22, at 486 (describing studies finding that "[r]emoving passives
improved comprehension significantly only in subordinate clauses"); Imwinkelreid &
Schwed, supra note 23, at 145 (noting psycholinguistic research findings to the same
effect); Tiersma, supra note 9, at 51 ("[T]he passive voice impedes comprehension
primarily when used in subordinate clauses-in main clauses, the passive voice does not
seem to cause any particular problems.").
92. See Tiersma, supra note 9, at 51.
93. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1326 ("Thus, there is some evidence
that passive constructions, when properly used and not obscured in subordinate clauses,
do not impede comprehension.").
94. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
95. Compound sentences are "sentence[s] made up of two or more independent
clauses properly connected," with the conjunctions "and," "but," and "or" most
commonly providing the connection. Kammer & Mulligan, supra note 71, § B22, at 6 1.
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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drawn some unfavorable reviews.' Compound sentences, like complex ones,97
tend to burden the mind of the juror with a barrage of ideas at once.9" Second,
several commentators have noted the negative impact upon comprehension of
the so-called "whiz", 9 or complement, deletion."°° This problem involves the
omission, from the beginning of a dependent clause,'0 ' of a relative pronoun
0 2
and a form of the verb "to be" (e.g., "covenant [that is] contained," "remedies
[that are] available").0 3 While whiz deletions, like nominalizations,"°4 serve to
shorten sentences and may in fact be more conversational," 5 they also force the
juror's mind to make the extra effort'"to fill in the missing words."" They add
to and complicate the juror's task of ingesting the meaning of the entire
instruction."° The presence of both compound sentences and whiz deletions in
the MAI verdict directors received the attention of this Comment.0 8
96. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 9, at 529 (making equal criticism of compound
and complex sentences); Severance, Greene & Loftus, supra note 9, at 208 (advocating
drafters avoid compound sentences and limit sentences to the expression of one idea).
97. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
98. Imwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23, at 146 ("Mhe draftsman should avoid
using compound sentences. The jurors are more likely to understand two concepts ifthey
are stated separately.").
99. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1323.
100. Imwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23, at 142-43.
101. See supra note 71.
102. Examples include "which," "who," and "that." Specifically, relative pronouns
are pronouns that "not only take the place of nouns but [also] join or relate a dependent
clause to ... another clause." Kammer & Mulligan, supra note 71, § A44, at 11.
103. Danet, supra note 22, at 479.
104. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
105. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1323 (noting the normal use of "whiz"
deletions in everyday English).
106. Imwinkelreid & Schwed, supra note 23, at 143.
107. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1323. Not surprisingly, Charrow &
Charrow found subject jurors less able to paraphrase the meaning of California pattern
jury instructions containing "whiz" deletions. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at
1323.
108. See infra note 118-21 and accompanying text.
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III. METHOD
With the foregoing ten common problem areas of pattern jury instructions
providing a sort of checklist for guidance," this Comment proceeded
sequentially through all fifteen of the MAI "plaintiff verdict directing" chapters,
encompassing 105 verdict directors in all." 0 The author checked each
instruction for the presence of the identified problems, making notations and
keeping a running numerical tally of the presence of each type of problem."' In
considering each instruction, this Comment ignored the standard MAI opening
sentence for verdict directors"' as well as each instruction's standard affirmative
defense "tail."". Within each instruction, the author did consider bracketed
words"' but ignored the italicized language found in parentheses."
109. These problem areas led to the author's formation of an actual "checklist,"
which included word frequency, nominalizations, negative words, "unique determiners,"
word lists, "as to" phrases, dependent clauses, use of the passive voice, compound
sentences and "whiz" deletions. See Charrow & Charrow, supra note 11, at 1336-37.
110. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
111. For example, if a particular verdict director contained four negative words, the
author noted this number, which could later be added to the tallies of negative words
from other instructions in that chapter.
112. This sentence reads as follows: "Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you
believe: . . . ." As this sentence constitutes a "right-branching" sentence by virtue of its
use of a dependent clause ("if you believe"), it seemed prudent not automatically to add
to the "dependent clause" tally each time the author turned a page. Charrow & Charrow,
supra note 11, at 1315.
113. The "tail" reads as follows: "[U]nless you believe plaintiff is not entitled to
recover by reason of Instruction Number ." MAI 33.01 [1996 Revision], "Converse
Instructions-General Comment." Since this "tail" includes two negative words, one
dependent clause, and one example of the passive voice, it again seemed advisable to
omit it from repeated consideration.
114. MAI 27.03 [1978 New], "Ejectment-Damages Only," for example, reads:
"[P]laintiff had the right to [joint] possession of the premises ... ." The word "joint"
may or may not be necessary based upon the facts of the case. The author considered
bracketed words and phrases because of the possibility of their use and because they
represent the approved, and sometimes mandatory, language of the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Jury Instructions.
115. The parentheses most often merely contain instructions regarding the type of
case-specific information that the judge or counsel should insert. However, they also
often contain examples of appropriate language. This Comment did not consider such
language because, within the MAI scheme, it serves as illustrative language only and
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To identify the presence of each of the ten common types of problems," 6
the author read each verdict director ten or more times, with each reading
designed to detect a different problem area. The search for low-frequency words
demanded use of the Thorndike & Lorge work in order to discover how
frequently MAI words appear in common written English." 7 The author
identified nominalizations," 8 negative words,1 9 "unique determiners,"'20 "as to"
phrases, and word lists from the face of each instruction. The same method
detected the presence of compound sentences and "whiz" deletions.' The
location of dependent clauses"z and the passive voice" within sentences
received attention in addition to the mere presence of these two problems.
116. See supra note 109.
117. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. The choice of which words
within a verdict director to check in Thomdike & Lorge was an inherently subjective
process. Because many seemingly common words turn out to be low-frequency words
according to the calculations of Thomdike & Lorge, the author sought to check on all but
the most common of words. For example, in the sentence "[D]efendant failed to keep a
careful lookout," as found in MAI 20.02, "Wrongful Death-Multiple Negligent Acts
Submitted," the author checked "failed," "careful," and "lookout." MAI 20.02 [1983
Revision]. A running tally was kept of words that, according to Thorndike & Lorge,
appear ten times or less per one million words of common written English. The
numerical tally included multiple usages of the same word within an instruction.
However, the repeatedly appearing words "plaintiff," "defendant," and "verdict" did not
receive attention. Also, words with mandatory accompanying definitions did not receive
attention, e.g., "negligence."
118. Nouns embodying the infinitive form of a verb, e.g., "use" and "damage," did
not receive attention. Rather, the author only tallied nouns that added some sort of
ending to a verb form, e.g., "failure" or "agreement." Again, when the same
nominalizations appeared more than once in the same instruction, the author recorded the
number of usages.
119. The author looked for any words having a negative meaning or having a
negative function in a sentence, not merely "no" and "not." See supra notes 56-57 and
accompanying text. As with low-frequency words and nominalizations, the presence of
the same negative word in multiple locations within an instruction received attention.
120. Since psycholinguistic researchers have not placed a great deal of emphasis
on "unique determiners," the author only noted the presence or absence of a "unique
determiner" in each verdict director, not paying attention to instances of multiple use
within an instruction. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. The author noted both the
presence of dependent clauses and whether each instance involved a right, lef or center
"branching" complex sentence.
123. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. The author recorded both the
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Observers should not regard the presence of any of the ten problem areas
in a MAI verdict director as trivial. For instance, while the presence of a
negative word in an instruction may not, in itself, have much of an impact on
juror comprehension, commentators and researchers have repeatedly emphasized
the cumulative adverse effect these problems have on understandability.'24 Thus,
in looking at the MAI verdict directors, the author was careful not to let any of
these problems go undetected.
IV. RESULTS
A. Overall Problems with MA1
1. Presence of Vocabulary Problems
Among the 105 MAI verdict directors, this Comment detected the presence
of 141 instances of the use of low-frequency words.'25 MAI 26.07, "Breach of
Bilateral Contract-When Substantial Performance Sufficient," contains the
most distressing isolated example in its use of the word "workmanlike."' 6 This
word is so obscure that it does not even appear in the "per million" tables of
Thomdike & Lorge. 127 Rather, those authors report that "workmanlike" is used
only seven times per four million words of common written English.'28 This
word should not appear in an instruction that jurors will hear in many simple
contracts cases.
129
Two MAI chapters emerged as particular areas of concern, containing low-
frequency words at a rate of at least two per instruction. First, Chapter 22,
"Owners and Occupiers of Land," uses 18 low-frequency words in its eight
instructions. 3 ' MAI 22.07, "Licensee," made the biggest contribution,
124. See, e.g., Lind & Partridge, supra note 28, at 69-70. Lind & Partridge state:
"The obstacles should be regarded as cumulative in their effect: A juror may be able to
understand with ease a single instruction, standing alone, that contains one or a few of
these features. But it may be much more difficult to understand a passage that contains
several of them.... ." Lind & Partridge, supra note 28, at 70. See also Charrow &
Charrow, supra note 11, at 1349-50 (empirically noting the impact of various problem
areas upon juror comprehension in both isolation and cumulative effect).
125. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
126. MAI 26.07 [1981 Revision].
127. See Thorndike & Lorge, supra note 39.
128. See Thomdike & Lorge, supra note 39.
129. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
130. Examples include "premises", (MAI 22.07 [1991 Revision], "Licensee") (used
only seven times per one million words of common written English), "excavation" (MAI
22.02 [1995 Revision], "Dangerous Condition Near Public Thoroughfare") (used five
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containing six low-frequency words."' Meanwhile, Chapter 25, "Breach of
Warranty and Product Liability," contains 20 low-frequency words in ten
instructions.' MAI 25.04, the verdict director for a strict liability product defect
claim, is the worst example, containing five low-frequency words.' Other
problem chapters include Chapter 23, "Intentional Torts,"'34 and Chapter 31,
"Miscellaneous.' 35
An even more recurring problem in the MAI verdict directors is the
presence of nominalizations, with the 105 verdict directors containing 196
examples.'36 MAI Chapter 27, "Ejectment," employs nominalizations to the
greatest extent, at a rate of six per instruction.' 37  Chapter 24, "Federal
times per one million words), and "barricade" (MAI 22.03 [1995 Revision], "Invitee
Injured") (three times per million). An explanation for the high rate of low-frequency
words in Chapter 22 is the repeated use of the words "reasonably" (e.g., MAI 22.08
[1978 New], "Highway Danger Created by Highway Construction Contractor") (used
seven times per million) and "unreasonable" (e.g., MAI 22.01 [1996 Revision],
'Trespassing Children") (eight times per million).
131. These include "premises" (used twice in the instruction), "reasonably" (used
three times), and "adequately." MAT 22.07 [1991 Revision].
132. Examples here include "adequately" (MAT 25.10(A) [1990 New], "Negligently
Supplying Dangerous Instrumentality") (three times per million), "conform" (MAI 25.07
[1991 Revision], "Breach of Express Warranty Under Uniform Commercial Code")
(seven times per million), "defective" (MAI 25.04 [1978 Revision], "Strict
Liability-Product Defect") (six times per million), and "unfit" (MAI 25.03 [1980
Revision], "Breach of Common Law Implied-Warranty of Fitness for a Particular
Purpose Under Uniform Commercial Code") (ten times per million). As with Chapter
22, the frequent use of the words "reasonably" and "unreasonably" contributes to the
high count of low-frequency words.
133. These include "defective" (used twice), "reasonably" (used twice), and
"unreasonably." MAT 25.04 [1978 Revision].
134. Chapter 23 contains 25 low-frequency words in its fourteen instructions. The
most infrequently used word was "instigate" (one time per million), which appears in
MAI 23.04 [1983 Revision], "False Imprisonment," and MAI 23.07 [1980 Revision],
"Malicious Prosecution-For Initiating Criminal or Ciyil Actions."
135. Chapter 31 contains 20 instructions, which use 27 low-frequency words. The
most noteworthy examples are "beneficiary" (MAI 31.08 [1978 Revision], "Life
Insurance Policy") (one time per million) and "assess" (MAI 31.04 [1991 Revision],
"Loss of Consortium, Loss of Services or Medical Expenses-Spouse or Child
Injured-For EITHER Comparative Fault or Non-Comparative Fault Submissions") (one
time per million).
136. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
137. Chapter 27 contains 24 nominalizations in its four instructions. Examples
include "knowledge" (MAI 27.03 [1978 New], "Ejectment-Damages Only"),
"improvements" (MAI 27.04 [1981 Revision], "Ejectment--Counterclaim for Value of
Improvements"), and "possession" (all four Chapter 27 instructions). The multiple usage
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Employers' Liability Act," contains four nominalizations per instruction.'3 8
Chapters containing nominalizations at a rate of at least three per instruction
include Chapter 18, "Agency in Issue,"'39 and Chapter 28, "Services Furnished
Decedent.""'4 Among the chapters containing more common types of verdict
directors, both Chapter 2311 and Chapter 25142 include nominalizations at a rate
of at least two per instruction.'43 In most instances, one can attribute a high
nominalization count in a particular MAI chapter to the multiple usage of words
peculiar to the chapter's underlying substantive subject matter.' 4
of the word "possession" in these four verdict directors contributes to the high
nominalization count. MAI 27.04 contains the most nominalizations, adding eight to the
tally. MAI 27.04 [1981 Revision].
138. Chapter 24 has twelve nominalizations in its three verdict directors, including,
e.g., "appliances" (MAT 24.01 [1992 Revision], "F.E.L.A.-Failure to Provide Safe Place
to Work"), "tender" (MAI 24.02 [1981 Revision], "F.E.L.A.-Boiler Act Violation"),
and "injury" (MAI 24.03 [1981 Revision], "F.E.L.A. Safety Appliance Act Violation").
Like the word "possession" in Chapter 27, the multiple usage of the words "employee"
and "employment" contributes to the high nominalization count in Chapter 24. MAI
24.02 contains the most nominalizations (five) among these three instructions. MAI
24.02 [1981 Revision].
139. Chapter 18 contains only one instruction (MAI 18.01 [1991 Revision],
"Agency in Issue-Modification Required"), but includes alternatives for when a suit
does not joif a servant and for when a suit joins both a master and a servant. Between
these two alternatives, MAI 18.01 uses three nominalizations, i.e. "employment" (used
twice) and "collision." MAI 18.01 [1991 Revision].
140. Chapter 28 uses twelve nominalizations among its four verdict directors.
Examples include the use in MAI 28.02, "Recovery for Services Fumished Decedent
Under Implied Contract Where Family Relationship Is Admitted or an Issue," of the
words "relationship," "agreement," and "payment." MAI 28.02 [1969 New]. Moreover,
the repeated use of the word "services" contributes to the high count in this chapter.
MAT 28.02 contains the most nominalizations (six) among Chapter 28's four instructions.
MA 28.02 [1969 New].
141. Chapter 23 includes 35 nominalizations among its 17 intentional tort
instructions. MA 23.06(1) [1980 New], "Libel-PlaintiffNot a Public Official or Public
Figure," uses nominalizations the most prevalently, containing seven examples, e.g.,
"statement" (used four times), "associations," and "reputation." MAI 23.05 [1996
Revision], "Fraudulent Misrepresentations," and MAI 23.10(1) [1980 New],
"Slander-Plaintiff Not a Public Official or Public Figure," both contain six
nominalizations, with MA 23.05 using the word "representation" six times.
142. Chapter 25 utilizes 22 nominalizations in its ten breach of warranty and
product liability instructions. MA 25.07, "Breach of Express Warranty Under Uniform
Commercial Code," adds the most to the tally, containing six nominalizations, e.g.,
"decision," "failure" (used twice), and "representation" (used twice). MA 25.07 [1991
Revision].
143. MA 23.06(1) [1980 New].
144. See supra notes 134-35.
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Negative words are less prevalent in the MAI, with the 105 verdict directors
containing only 57 examples. 4 ' Only Chapter 22146 and Chapter 25147 use
negative words at a rate greater than one per instruction. Several chapters
contain no negative words or use negative words very infrequently.'48 More
impressively, though many instructions contain multiple negative words, the
author found only two instances where two or more negative words appear in the
same sentence.
49
Results varied with respect to the problems of "unique determiners," "as to"
phrases, and word lists. 5 ° First, the use of the word "such" as a unique
determiner' seems to constitute a favored drafting technique of the Missouri
Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions. This word, in its "unique
determiner" form, appears in almost half of the MAI verdict directors,
specifically in 50 of the 105 instructions."5 2 In contrast, the author found only
145. See supra notes 56-57, 119 and accompanying text.
146. Chapter 22 contains twelve negative words among its eight verdict directors
dealing with the liability of owners and occupiers of land. Three of these eight
instructions use more than one negative word, with MAI 22.07, "Licensee," using the
word "not" three times. MAI 22.07 [1991 Revision].
147. There are fifteen negative words among Chapter 25's ten breach of warranty
and products liability instructions. Three of the ten instructions, MAI 25.03 [1980
Revision], 25.05 [1978 New], and 25.08 [1980 New], contain more than one negative
word. MAI 25.05 [1978 New], "Strict Liability-Failure to Warn," is the biggest
contributor to the total tally (four negative words), placing two negative words in the
same sentence: "[T]he [describe product] was then unreasonably dangerous when put
to a reasonably anticipated use without knowledge of its characteristics . .. ." (emphasis
added). This repeated use of the word "unfit" in this chapter also contributed to the high
count of negative words.
148. See, e.g., Chapter 17 ("Motor Vehicles"), which uses only two negative words
in eighteen instructions.
149. A sentence in MAI 24.02, "F.E.L.A.--Boiler Act Violation," actually
containedfour negative words in one sentence: "[D]efendant [used a locomotive] which
was not in proper condition and which could not be safely operated without unnecessary
peril of life and limb." MAI 24.02 [1981 Revision]. MAI 25.05 contains the other
example. MAI 25.05 [1978 New]. See supra note 143. As one commentator put it,
"[firom so many negatives, nothing positive can develop." MORTON S. FREEMAN, THE
GRAMMATICAL LAWYER 225 (1979).
150. See supra notes 62-65, 120 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., MAI 31.02(1) [1997 Revision], "Res Ipsa Loquitur-Pedestrian"
("such occurrence was directly caused ... .") (emphasis added); MAI 23.05 [1996
Revision], "Fraudulent Misrepresentations" ("[A]s a direct result of such representation
the plaintiff was damaged.").
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three examples of the use of an "as to" phrase.' 3 Similarly, the MAI verdict
directors contain few examples of unnecessary word lists, or "doublets."' 54
2. Presence of Grammatical Problems
The 105 MAI verdict directors contain at least 86 dependent clauses.'"
Many instructions have multiple dependent clauses,'5 6 often with two or more in
the same sentence.'5 7 Chapter 31 was the leading contributor, containing 27
dependent clauses among its 20 instructions.' Other chapters containing
dependent clauses at a rate of more than one dependent clause per instruction
included Chapters 18,' 23,16 25, 16129,162 and 30.163
153. These instructions included: MAI 23.06(2) [1980 New], "Libel-Plaintiff a
Public Official or Public Figure" ("[D]efendant had serious doubt as to whether it was
true ...."); MAI 23.10(2) [1980 New], "Slander-Plaintiff a Public Official or Public
Figure" (same); MAI 28.02 [1969 New], "Recovery for Services Furnished Decedent
Under Implied Contract Where Family Relationship Is Admitted or an Issue" ("mhe
conduct and relationship of plaintiff and [decedent] was such as to imply an
agreement .... ).
154. But see MAI 29.01 [1978 Revision], "Real Estate Commission-Sale Not
Consummated" ("ready, willing and able"); MAI 31.17 [1992 New], "Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity-Dangerous Condition of Public Entity's Property Created by
Employee" ("scope and course"); MAI 31.21 [1995 New], "Partial Invalidity of Will
Due to Fraud" ("will and testament").
155. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., MAI 22.01 [1996 Revision], "Trespassing Children" (dependent
clauses in the second and third sentence); MAI 25.10(A) [1990 New], "Negligently
Supplying Dangerous Instrumentality" (fourth and fifth sentences); MAI 29.04 [1978
Revision], "Real Estate Commission-Sale Consummated-Exclusive Right to Sell"
(second and third sentences).
157. See, e.g., MAI 22.07 [1991 Revision], "Licensee" ("[D]efendant knew or had
information from [1] which defendant... should have known [2] that persons... would
not discover such condition ... ."); MAI 25.03 [1980 Revision], "Breach of Common
Law Implied-Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose Under Uniform Commercial
Code" ("[W]ithin a reasonable time [1] afterplaintiffknew or should have known [2] the
product was notfitfor such use, plaintiff gave defendant notice thereof ....").
158. MAI 31.04 [1991 Revision], "Loss of Consortium.. ." takes the prize for
grammatical complexity, containing four dependent clauses in the instruction's lone
sentence: "[1] Ifyou find in favor ofplaintiff... and [2] ifyou believe [3] that plaintiff
sustained damage ... then in your verdict you must find [4] that plaintiff did sustain
such damage."
159. Chapter 18's single instruction contained two dependent clauses, both found
in the instruction's second alternative for suits joining both master and servant.
160. Chapter 23 includes fourteen dependent clauses to match its seventeen
intentional tort instructions. The third sentence of MAI 23.10(2) [1980 New],
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More encouraging is the fact that among the 86 dependent clauses, only
fourteen precede independent clauses as part of "left-branching" sentences.'
The most prevalent use of this technique appears in Chapter 25, where almost
half of the dependent clauses appear before the independent clause. 65 Other
chapters using this technique on multiple occasions include Chapter 30 (three
times)" and Chapter 31 (four times). 67
The passive voice is just as prevalent in the verdict directors as dependent
clauses, with this Comment detecting 83 uses of the passive voice in the 105
instructions. 61 Chapter 25, in its breach of warranty and products liability
instructions, employs the passive voice far more often than any of the other MAI
chapters. Where none of the other chapters use the passive voice more often
than once per instruction, 9 Chapter 25 uses the passive voice 26 times in its ten
instructions, 70 with ten uses appearing in the two strict liability verdict
"Slander-Plaintiff a Public Official or Public Figure," weaves four dependent clauses
into a single sentence: "[D]efendant [published such statement] with knowledge [1] that
it was false, or with reckless disregard for [2] whether it was true or false at a time [3]
when defendant had serious doubt as to [4] whether it was true .... "
161. One can find eleven dependent clauses in Chapter 25's eleven breach of
warranty and product liability instructions. MAI 25.03 [1980 Revision], dealing with the
U.C.C. implied warranty of fitness, is the most complex example, using four dependent
clauses among its sentences.
162. Chapter 29 actually contains dependent clauses at a rate of two per instruction,
using eight of these clauses in four instructions. MAI 29.04 [1978 Revision], "Real
Estate Commission-Sale Consummated-Exclusive Right to Sell," contributes four
dependent clauses. See supra note 152.
163. Chapter 30, "Third Party Plaintiff," has three dependent clauses in its three
verdict directors.
164. See supra notes 76-81, 122 and accompanying text.
165. Specifically, five of Chapter 25's eleven dependent clauses appeared before
the independent clause in "left-branching" sentences. Two of the verdict directors use
multiple dependent clauses before the independent clause. The fourth sentence of MAI
25.08 [1980 New], "Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Under Uniform
Commercial Code," provides one example: "[W]ithin a reasonable time [1] afterplaintiff
knew or should have known [2] the product was not fit for such purpose, plaintiff gave
defendant notice thereof ... ." MA 25.03 [1980 Revision] provides the other example
in its fifth sentence. See supra note 153.
166. All three verdict directors in this chapter place dependent clauses before the
independent clause.
167. See MAI 31.12 [1978 New], "Uninsured Motor Vehicle-Insurer and
Uninsured Driver Joined." See supra note 158 with respect to MA 31.04.
168. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., MAI 25.01 [1981 Revision], "Breach of Warranty of Title to
Personalty" (fourth sentence); MAI 25.02 [1981 Revision], "Breach of Common Law
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directors.' The passive voice appears at an exact rate of one use per instruction
in Chapters 26,172 27,173 and 29.174
However, only fifteen of the 83 instances of passive voice appear in
dependent clauses. 7 ' Interestingly, the most prevalent use of this technique did
not appear in Chapter 25,176 but rather in the intentional tort verdict directors of
Implied-Warranty of Fitness for Consumption" (third and fourth sentences); MAI 25.03
[1980 Revision], "Breach of Common Law Implied-Warranty of Fitness for a Particular
Purpose Under Uniform Commercial Code" (breach of U.C.C. implied warranty of
fitness) (second, fourth and sixth sentences); MAI 25.07 [1991 Revision], "Breach of
Express Warranty Under Uniform Commercial Code," (breach of U.C.C. express
warranty) (same); MAI 25.08 [1980 New], "Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability Under Uniform Commercial Code," (breach of U.C.C. implied warranty
of merchantability) (second and fifth sentences); MAI 25.09 [1990 New], "Products
Liability-Negligent Manufacture, Design, or Failure to Warn" (fourth sentence); MAI
25.10(A) [1990 New], "Negligently Supplying Dangerous Instrumentality" (third and
fourth sentences); MA 25.10(B) [1995 Revision], "Negligently Supplying Dangerous
Instrumentality for Supplier's Business Purposes" (second and third sentences).
171. See MA 25.04 [1978 Revision], "Strict Liability-Product Defect" ("when
put to," "[product] was used," "manner reasonably anticipated," "plaintiff was damaged,"
"[product] was sold"); MAI 25.05 [1978 New], "Strict Liability-Failure to Warn"
(same).
172. The seven contract verdict directors of Chapter 26 contain seven uses of the
passive voice. See, e.g., MA 26.01 [1980 Revision], "Breach of Unilateral Contract"
("acts called for," "plaintiff was thereby damaged"); MAI 26.02 [1980 Revision],
"Breach of Bilateral Contract-Breach Sole Issue" ("obligations were not performed");
MAI 26.04 [1981 Revision], "Account Stated-Matured Debts" ("transaction
mentioned").
173. Chapter 27 uses the passive voice four times in its four ejectment instructions.
See, e.g., MAI 27.01 [1981 Revision], "Ejectment Against a Stranger" ("premises
claimed by plaintiff'); MA 27.04 [1981 Revision], "Ejectment-Counterclaim for Value
of Improvements" ("improvements were made in good faith").
174. Like Chapter 27, Chapter 29 contains four examples of the passive voice in
its four real estate commission instructions. All four instances involve the phrase
"property was sold."
175. See supra notes 91-93, 123 and accompanying text.
176. Only two of the 24 instances of passive voice in Chapter 25 appeared in
dependent clauses. See MAT 25.03 [1980 Revision], "Strict Liability-Failure to Wam"
("[D]efendant then knew or should have known of the use for which the [product] was
purchased.. . ."); MAI 25.04 [1978 Revision], "Strict Liability-Product Defect"
("[P]laintiff was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition as existed when
the [product] was sold.").
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Chapter 23.1' The drafters used the technique on multiple occasions in Chapters
22, 17829,179 and 31.180
Compound sentences and whiz deletions appear less frequently in the MAI
verdict directors than dependent clauses and the passive voice.'81 The 105
instructions contain eighteen compound sentences, with the most prevalent use
occurring in Chapter 22.82 Chapter 24 also deserves note for its use of
compound sentences in each of its three verdict directors.8 3 The MAI verdict
directors also use at least 25 whiz deletions. Chapter 25 and its ten instructions
use this device eight times, more than any of the other chapters.'14 Frequent use
also appears in Chapters 2185 and 27.186
177. Chapter 23's fourteen instructions use the passive voice twelve times, with
four ofthose instances occurring within dependent clauses. See, e.g., MAI 23.05 [1996
Revision], "Fraudulent Misrepresentations" ("[D]efendant knew that it was false at the
time the representation was made. . . .") (emphasis added); MAI 23.08 [1990 Revision],
"Service Letters" ("[D]efendant's letter did not correctly state the true cause for which
plaintiff was terminated.. . .") (emphasis added).
178. See MAI 22.01 [1996 Revision], '"Trespassing Children" (second and third
sentences); MAI 22.02 [1995 Revision], "Dangerous Condition Near Public
Thoroughfare" (second sentence).
179. See MAI 29.02 [1978 Revision], "Real Estate Commission-Sale
Consummated-Agreed Commission" (second sentence); MA 29.04 [1978 Revision],
"Real Estate Commission-Sale Consummated-Exclusive Right to Sell" (third and
fourth sentences).
180. See MAI 31.05 [1981 Revision], "Eminent Domain" (first and second
sentences); MAT 31.14 [1983 New], "Commitment for Mental Illness" (first sentence).
181. See supra notes 95-103, 121 and accompanying text.
182. Chapter 22's eight instructions relating to the liability of owners and occupiers
of land contain five compound sentences. See the first sentences of MAT 22.03 [1995
Revision], "Invitee Injured"; MAI 22.05 [1981 Revision], 'Tenant Injured on Premises
Reserved for Common Use"; MAT 22.07 [1991 Revision], 'licensee"; MAT 22.08 [1978
New], "Highway Danger Created by Highway Construction Contractor"; MAI 22.09
[1993 New], "Sidewalk Defect-Dangerous Condition Created by Abutting Landowner."
183. The first sentences of each of these instructions contain compound sentences.
184. The two strict liability instructions are examples of multiple usage of "whiz"
deletions in Chapter 25 within the same instruction. See, e.g., MAI 25.04 [1978
Revision], "Strict Liability-Product Defect" ("when [it was] put," "manner [that was]
reasonably anticipated").
185. Chapter 21 contains five "whiz" deletions in its six verdict directors. All five
instances involve use of the phrase "respects [that are] submitted." See, e.g., MAI 21.02
[1988 New], "Actions Against Health Care Providers-Single or Multiple Defendants
With Comparative Fault-Multiple Negligent Acts" (second sentence).
186. Three of Chapter 27's four verdict directors contain "whiz" deletions. All
three examples involve the phrase "premises [that was] claimed." See, e.g., MA 27.01
[1981 Revision], "Ejectment Against a Stranger" (first sentence).
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B. Problems in Specific Common Instructions
1. Negligence
MAI 17.01, "Single Negligent Act Submitted," and MAI 17.02, "Multiple
Negligent Acts Submitted," provide the standard instructions for use in most
simple negligence cases.'87 MAI 17.03 through 17.20 set forth possible
negligent acts that one may insert into MAI 17.01 and MAI 17.02.88 In their
skeleton forms, these two instructions contain only a few problems: both
needlessly use the word "such" as a "unique determiner" and MAI 17.02 creates
needless confusion through use of the passive form "submitted."' 89
However, many more problems emerge in the potpourri of possible
insertions that one finds in MAI 17.03 through 17.20. MAI 17.17, "Per se
Negligence-Improper Turn,"' for example, is virtually incomprehensible.' 9'
Meanwhile, the confusing language of MAI 17.19,'" which the drafters lifted
187. MAI 17.01 [1980 Revision], for example, covers the common elements of
breach of duty, causation and damages by providing: "Your verdict must be for the
plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant [committed the alleged negligent act], and
Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and Third, as a direct result of such negligence
plaintiff sustained damage." MAI. 17.01's "Notes on Use" point out the necessity of
defining the words "negligent" and "negligence." MAI 17.01 [1980 Revision].
188. See, e.g., MAI 17.03 [1965 New], "Excessive Speed;" MAI 17.06 [1965
New], "Failure to Signal Intention to Turn;" MAI 17.08 [1965 New], "Failure to Yield
Right-of-Way."
189. The presence of only two problems does not mean that these two instructions
could not use some "cleaning up." The drafters should replace examples of legalese such
as "thereby" and "respects" (used as plural noun) and should question their placement
of the prepositional phrase "in any one or more of the respects submitted in paragraph
First" in the middle of MAI 17.02's second clause. MAI 17.02 [1980 Revision].
190. In describing one possible negligent act of a defendant, this instruction states:
"[D]efendant in approaching the intersection intending to turn left failed to drive his
automobile in the portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line ....
MAI 17.17 [1978 Revision].
191. The drafters weave two low-frequency words, "intersection" and "roadway,"
into an instruction that, the author suspects, refers to the act of turning left from the right
lane of a four-lane road. MAI 17.17 [1978 Revision].
192. MAI 17.19 [1969 New], "Unable to Stop Within Range of Vision," provides:
"Defendant drove at a speed which made it impossible for him to stop within the range
of his visibility." This sentence contains one negative word, "impossible," and one low-
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straight from an appellate opinion, 93 questions the contention that the drafters
place equal emphasis on legal accuracy and juror comprehension. 194 MAI 17.04,
"Failure to Act After Danger of Collision Apparent," also presents many




Jurors in Missouri hear MAI 23.01 and MAI 23.02, respectively, in
common cases involving assault and/or battery. MAI 23.01, "Assault," may
impede juror comprehension through its double use of the nominalization
"apprehension" and its use of the low-frequency word "bodily."'98 MAI 23.02,
"Battery," also uses the word "bodily," throwing in the low-frequency word
"intentional" for good measure."
Fraudulent misrepresentation is another intentional tort that one commonly
expects to arise in Missouri trial courts, making MAI 23.05 and its many
problems particularly onerous. This instruction's vocabulary problems include
use of the negative word "not," the nominalization "representation" (seven
times) and the word "such" as a unique determiner.2" MAI 23.05 also has
numerous problems in its sentence structure, containing three dependent
clauses,20' one compound sentence 2 and two instances of the passive voice.03
193. The "[Drafting] Committee Comment" chalks up MAI 17.19 to the language
of Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 261 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1953).
194. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
195. The instruction uses the common legal nominalization "collision." MAI 17.04
[1978 Revision].
196. These include "likelihood," "collision," "swerve," and "slacken" (used three
times). The legalistic word "thereafter" is a little too common (appearing fourteen times
per one million words of common written English) to qualify as a low-frequency word.
MAI 17.04 [1978 Revision]. See Thorndike & Lorge, supra note 39.
197. MAI 17.04's dependent clause makes this instruction a right-branching
sentence: "Defendant knew or ... could have known that there was a reasonable
likelihood of collision.. . ." MAI 17.04 [1978 Revision].
198. "Apprehension" does not exactly represent a high-frequency word, appearing
only eleven times per million according to Thomdike & Lorge. See Thomdike & Lorge,
supra note 39.
199. Thorndike & Lorge report that the word "intentional" appears only twice per
one million words. MAI 23.02 [1990 Revision]. See Thomdike & Lorge, supra note 39.
200. In addition, the words "rely" (used twice in MAI 23.05), "representation"
(used seven times), and "vehicle" (used twice) barely escape classification as low-
frequency words, each appearing just thirteen times per one million words. See
Thorndike & Lorge, supra note 39.
201. The instruction's first element states: "[D]efendant... intending that plaintiff
19971
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The MAI's verdict directors for slander cases may also unnecessarily tax
the minds ofjurors. MAI 23.10(1), "Slander-Plaintiff Not a Public Official or
Public Figure," is riddled with nominalizations2 °4 and contains one low-
frequency word ("ridicule") and two passive constructions. 5 MAI 23.10(2),
"Slander-Public Official or Public Figure," avoids nominalizations2 6 but adds
the word "disregard" (both negative and low-frequency), an "as to" phrase, and
four dependent clauses within one sentence.
2 7
3. Warranty and Product Liability
The MAI's verdict directors for strict liability in tort, MAI 25.04 through
25.05, both give jurors five opportunities for distraction via the passive voice.0 8
Both instructions also bombard jurors with negative2 ' and low-frequency 210
words, nominalizations,21 ' whiz deletions, 2 2 and unnecessary legalese.
213
rely upon such representation .... ." The third element sets forth two more dependent
clauses: (1) "defendant knew that it was false" and (2) "defendant did not know whether
the representation was true orfalse." MAI 23.05 [1996 Revision] (emphasis added).
202. The instruction's fifth element contains the compound sentence.
203. One finds the passive voice in the instruction's third element ("the
representation was made") and sixth element ("the plaintiff was damaged).
204. These include "statement" (used three times), "hatred," "associations," and
"reputation." MAI 23.10(1) [1980 New].
205. These include "statement was heard' (fourth element) and "reputation was
thereby damaged" (fifth element). MAI 23.10(1) [1980 New] (emphasis added).
206. MAI 23.10(2) does contain the nominalization "knowledge." MAI 23.10(2)
[1980 New].
207. MAI 23.10(2)'s third element provides: "Defendant either: with knowledge
that it wasfalse, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false at a time when
defendant had serious doubt as to whether it was true . " MAI 23.10(2) [1980 New)
(emphasis added).
208. These include "when put to," "[product] was used," "manner reasonably
anticipated," "plaintiff was damaged" and "[product] was sold."
209. MAI 25.04 [1978 Revision], "Strict Liability-Product Defect," uses the
negative word "unreasonably" while MAI 25.05 [1978 New], "Strict Liability-Failure
to Warn," tosses out "unreasonably," "not," and "without" (twice).
210. Examples include "defective," "reasonably" and "unreasonably."
211. MAT 25.05 [1978 New] uses "knowledge," "characteristics" and "warning"
(twice).
212. Both instructions make the two following deletions: "when [it was] put" and
"manner [that was] reasonably anticipated."
213. Before (and-most likely-after) their first-year contracts and torts classes,
few law students or attorneys converse in such phrases as "course of defendant's
business" and "defective condition unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably
[Vol. 62
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The MAI's warranty instructions, which jurors may often hear in the same
case with the strict liability instructions, contain many of the same problems.
MAI 25.07, "Breach of Express Warranty Under Uniform Commercial Code,"
among its many problems," 4 loads up on nominalizations215 and passive
constructions." 6 Meanwhile MAI 25.08, "Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability Under Uniform Commercial Code," is also likely to befuddle
jurors by including three negative words 17 and by jamming two dependent
clauses218 into a left-branching sentence.
21 9
4. Breach of Contract
Jurors also will often face the task of trying to understand the several
breach-of-contract instructions that one finds in MAI Chapter 26. MAI 26.01,
"Breach of Unilateral Contract," makes this task difficult through overuse of
dependent clauses"0 and the passive voice. 21 Similarly, MAI 26.02, "Breach of
Bilateral Contract-Breach Sole Issue," is teeming with negative words,'
nominalizations and the passive voice. 4 Meanwhile, MAI 26.06, "Breach of
anticipated use."
214. MAI 25.07 [1991 Revision] also uses the negative word "not," the low-
frequency word "conform" (three times), "such" as a "unique determiner," one
compound sentence (first element), one "whiz" deletion ("representation [that was]
made"), and one dependent clause ("after plaintiff knew" in the fifth element).
215. This instruction uses "notice" and "decision," and twice includes
"representation" and "failure." MAL 25.07 [1991 Revision].
216. The three examples include "representation was made" (third element),
"representation made by defendant" (fourth element), and "plaintiff was damaged" (sixth
element). MAI 25.07 [1991 Revision].
217. These include "not" (twice) and "unfit." MAI 25.08 [1980 New].
218. This instruction's fourth element states: "[W]ithin a reasonable time after
plaintiff knew or should have known [that] the product was notfitfor such purpose,
plaintiff gave defendant notice thereof ...." MAI 25.08 [1980 New] (emphasis added).
219. MAI 25.08's other problems include two nominalizations ("product" and
"notice"), one low-frequency word ("unfit"), a "unique determiner," one "whiz" deletion
("[that] the product was not fit") and two passive constructions (second and fifth
elements). MAT 25.08 [1980 New].
220. This instruction's first element ("if plaintiff would") and fourth element
("what he had so offered") are the culprits here. MA 26.01 [1980 Revision].
221. See, e.g., "act called for in such offer," "plaintiff was thereby damaged."
MA 26.01 [1980 Revision] (emphasis added).
222. See, e.g., "not" (twice). MAT 26.02 [1980 Revision].
223. See, e.g., "failure" and "obligations." MAI 26.02 [1980 Revision].
224. See, e.g., "obligations were not performed," "plaintiff was thereby damaged."
MAT 26.02 [1980 Revision] (emphasis added).
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Bilateral Contract-Terms and Breach in Issue," and MAI 26.07, "Breach of
Bilateral Contract-When Substantial Performance Sufficient," pack in
nominalizations2 and low-frequency words.' Finally, MAI 26.04, a common
instruction in debt actions, also contains an assortment of problems, including
the word "transaction,"27 a dose of legalese,' and two dependent clauses in one
sentence.2 9
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment was not to single out the MAI verdict
directors as any less comprehensible than the pattern jury instructions of other
states, nor to argue that jurors in Missouri civil cases are generally in any sort of
"fog" after hearing or reading the instructions in a given case. Rather, the
purpose was to point out that, under a regime in which trial judges must use
applicable MAI instructions without modification, the drafters must take steps
to maximize the understandability of these instructions. The summary of the
findings of this Comment, grounded in the criticisms of numerous commentators
and empirical researchers, supports the proposition that the MAI verdict directors
contain many barriers to maximum juror comprehension:
- The MAI verdict directors make routine use of words that rarely
appear in everyday spoken and written English.
- To an even greater extent these verdict directors replace common
verbs with mechanical noun forms known as "nominalizations."
- MAI uses negative words, which add an unnecessary layer to the
comprehension process, at a rate of more than one negative word per
every two verdict directors.
- The MAI verdict directors add unnecessary complexity to their
sentences by frequent use of dependent clauses, often packing several
into single sentences and instructions.
225. See, e.g., the use of "agreement" three times in each instruction. MAI 26.07
[1981 Revision].
226. See, e.g., MAI 26.07's use of "substantially" and the obscure word
"workmanlike." MAI 26.07 [1981 Revision]. See supra note 126 and accompanying
text.
227. "Transaction" is both a nominalization and low-frequency word. MA 26.04
[1981 Revision].
228. The author hopes never to hear the phrase "transaction mentioned in
evidence" outside a courtroom. This phrase is also responsible for injecting a passive
construction and a "whiz" deletion into the mix. MA 26.04 [1981 Revision].
229. This instruction's first element states: "[P]laintiff and defendant agreed that
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- The MAI risks confusing jurors by repeatedly omitting the "doer"
from its verdict director sentences by use of the passive voice.
- Frequent examples appear in the MAI verdict directors of other
vocabulary and grammatical comprehension concerns, such as "unique
determiners," compound sentences and "whiz" deletions.
- All of these problems readily appear in the most commonly used
verdict directors, such as those instructions addressing negligence and
breach of contract.
These findings come as no real surprise: scholars have identified these
problems in the pattern jury instructions of most states. What is disconcerting,
however, is that while these problems exist, Missouri trial judges have no power
to remedy juror confusion, even when jurors make their confusion known to a
judge. If MAI instructions are to remain "untouchable" by trial judges and
attorneys, the drafting committee must take measures to clean up the
gobbledygook. It must not remain lost on the drafters that they are lawyers,
specially trained to think and write in a professional language-a language of
confusion and gibberish to most lay jurors. The author hopes that the findings
of this Comment provide suggestions for improving the comprehensibility of the
MAI verdict directors as the drafting committee engages in its perpetual task of
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